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Trial judges have difficult jobs. They must often make onthe-spot decisions, such as ruling on an objection at trial, with
little or no time for reflection. They must grapple with zealous
lawyers while navigating a fine line between ensuring due
process and fairness to self-represented litigants and maintaining
neutrality and fairness to the opposing side. As first-line
decision makers, they must sometimes resolve difficult issues in
a legal vacuum, as with an issue of first impression. Little about
the trial judge’s role in the administration of justice is easy.
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And, of course, nearly every decision a trial judge makes is
subject to challenge on appeal by any party who believes the
decision is wrong. After twenty-five years of reviewing
thousands of trial and intermediate appellate court decisions for
error in all types of cases, it is apparent to me there are some
common ways trial judges attract greater scrutiny on appeal than
they otherwise might. This essay addresses some of the more
common ones.
A. USING HUMOR IMPROPERLY
“Humor in the judicial system is not funny.” 1 After
attending national conferences at which judicial writing is
featured as a prominent topic, I am always struck by the division
among judges, both state and federal, over whether humor has
an appropriate place in a court’s written decision. Some judges
believe, and strenuously assert, that judicial writing is
unnecessarily
dull,
uninspiring,
and
unimaginative.
Consequently, some judges see nothing wrong with injecting a
bit of levity into an otherwise cold, impersonal, and technical
way of conducting business. For example, in a case involving
the issue of whether the defendant, a married man, should be
placed on probation for attempting to convince a minor to check
into a hotel with him, the court observed:

While it is difficult to know what, if any, reaction the
defendant, his wife, the prosecutor, or anyone else associated
with this case had upon reading the court’s decision, it is not farfetched to imagine that such commentary in the opinion may
have been viewed as offensive or even hurtful. Perhaps worse, it

05/10/2017 10:58:23

1. Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion
Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 271 (2008).
2. State v. Silva, 477 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Tenn. 1972).
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This defendant has in the eyes of the law done wrong, but
not enough in this instance to be jailed, and the least the
trial judge can do is to relieve him of his temporary
sentence, and remember that he is forever and eternally on
probation to his wife, who will be his wife, his warden and
parole officer all wrapped up in one. What a sad fate for
any poor mortal to face. 2
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may have been viewed as diminishing the seriousness of the
crime of which the defendant was convicted.
But some judges are skilled enough to inject humor in such
a way to avoid giving offense. For instance, in a case about
fertilizer and tax deductions, a federal court of appeals wrote
that
“[t]o every thing there is a season, and a time to every
purpose under the heaven: A time to be born, and a time to
die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is
planted; a time to purchase fertilizer, and a time to take a
deduction for that which is purchased.” 3

In another case involving the tort principle of attractive
nuisance, the court declared that
[w]hile we acknowledge the picturesque beauty of the
rolling hills and majestic mountains of Tennessee and agree
that they are attractive, the fortunate fact that God has
strewn His splendor with such a lavish hand and blessed
our state with great beauty, and has made it a veritable
playground, hardly affords a reason to classify any normal
topographical feature as an attractive nuisance. 4

05/10/2017 10:58:23

3. Schenk v. Comm’r, 686 F.2d 315, 316 (5th Cir. 1982).
4. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 558 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Tenn. 1977).
5. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE JUDICIAL HUMORIST: A COLLECTION OF JUDICIAL
OPINIONS AND OTHER FRIVOLITIES vii (1952).
6. Lebovits, Curtin & Solomon, supra note 1, at 272.
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It is difficult to imagine a reasonable reader taking offense at
either of these cleverly written observations.
There is, of course, a self-evident danger in attempting to
weave humor into judicial writing—the parties, and perhaps a
reviewing court, may feel that the judge did not take the case
seriously. Consequently, some legal scholars counsel against
using humor in judicial writing, given that “[t]he litigant has
vital interests at stake . . . and the robed buffoon who makes
merry at his expense should be choked with his own wig.” 5
Other commentators assert that “[l]itigants consciously place the
court in a position of power to resolve controversies; they expect
to be treated fairly and with dignity,” and then point out that
“[h]umor can defy both expectations.” 6
My own view is that attempts at being cute or humorous in
a written decision should be avoided for fear of being perceived
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as flippant, uncaring, or unprofessional by the parties, other
courts (in particular, an appellate court charged with reviewing
the decision), or the public in general. As stated by the Kansas
Supreme Court, “[j]udges simply should not ‘wisecrack’ at the
expense of anyone connected with a judicial proceeding,” for
“[w]hen judges do this . . . respect for the administration of
justice suffers.” 7 The risk of giving the parties the impression
that the judge is making light of their situation is just not worth
it.
B. DISCOUNTING THE LAW

05/10/2017 10:58:23

7. In re Rome, 542 P.2d 676, 685 (Kan. 1975).
8. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1978) (“Our individual
appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the
Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an
enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to
an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of
veto.”). On the other hand, a statute’s meaning can sometimes be less clear than the judge
would hope, see, e.g., Steven Wisotsky, How to Interpret Statutes—Or Not: Plain Meaning
and Other Phantoms, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321, 324 (2009) (asserting that
“superficially clear statutory language may upon concentrated analysis prove ambiguous”
and that “there is no plain meaning without context”), but judges are nonetheless charged
with determining plain meaning and then applying the law.
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Public confidence in the performance and impartiality of
the courts is maintained only when judges rigorously follow the
law. The basic idea, of course, is that judges should interpret
statutes and other laws as they find them and apply those laws
faithfully according to their plain meaning. The discretion to
establish public policy is generally committed to legislative
bodies, not to the courts. Thus, to avoid reading their own
beliefs and values into the law, judges are expected to apply the
law as written. Put another way, it is not the province of the
judge to second-guess the wisdom of legislation and decide
cases based on what the judge believes the law should be. 8 No
reasonable jurist would seriously contend otherwise.
Similarly, most judges would readily agree that decisional
inconsistency and unpredictability represent the antithesis of an
efficient and effective system of resolving disputes. Yet, court
decisions that fail to faithfully follow the law can create just the
sort of inconsistency and unpredictability that can undermine the
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efficiency and effectiveness of our judicial system. The result is
diminished public confidence in the integrity of the courts.
Accordingly, few things attract the attention of a reviewing
court more quickly than a lower court’s failure to correctly
identify and apply settled legal principles. Reviewing courts will
not fully trust the work of a court with a demonstrated pattern of
failing to follow the law. Or to put it differently, trial judges
undermine their credibility with appellate courts by repeatedly
misstating the law—albeit inadvertently—or by not adhering to
relevant legal standards. Once a judicial reputation is diminished
in this regard, it is not easily rehabilitated.
C. MISSTATING KEY FACTS

05/10/2017 10:58:23

9. See, e.g., DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 (1974) (acknowledging that
when a “factual issue was dispositive of the case . . . , it would have been better practice
not to resolve it in the Court of Appeals based only on the materials then before the court”
and that “[t]he issue should have been remanded for initial disposition in the District Court
after an evidentiary hearing”).
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Trial courts are, of course, primarily fact-finding courts. 9
Thus, it is no small matter when a trial court misapprehends or
misconstrues crucial facts. Appellate judges can readily identify
trial courts in their jurisdictions that are careful when making
factual determinations and those that are not. Naturally,
decisions by judges in the latter category tend to be reviewed,
consciously or unconsciously, more closely on appeal.
Cases are not decided in a factual vacuum and, generally
speaking, the law has little meaning outside the factual context
in which it has been applied. Accordingly, the difficulty
attendant to a judge’s misapprehension of even one key fact is
that it can skew the resulting legal analysis. Indeed, such a
mistake can be outcome determinative. Thus, to state the
obvious, factual assertions in a court’s decision must be
completely accurate. Courts, both trial and appellate, take a dim
view of lawyers who incorrectly present the facts, cite cases that
have little to do with the proposition for which they are cited,
take testimony out of context, or exaggerate the proof. The same
applies to judges.
In short, carelessness with the facts will attract the attention
of a higher court. A judge’s credibility and reputation are hard-
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earned assets, and misstating the essential facts of the case or the
law, even if unintentional, undermines both. To avoid this
pitfall, judges, regardless of court, must be meticulously
accurate in describing the factual record. As one trial judge
observed when considering the lapses in professional conduct of
an attorney appearing before him, a reputation “for intellectual
and ethical integrity” is either the “greatest asset” or “worst
enemy” of anyone working in the law, so the judge
recommended “treat[ing] . . . every daily task as if your career
will be judged on it.” 10 That standard rings as true for the
members of the trial and appellate benches as for the members
of the bar.
D. STRAYING BEYOND THE RECORD
From the perspective of an appellate court, evaluating a
trial court’s decision necessarily entails taking into account
information the trial court had before it at the time the issues
were decided, as opposed to the potentially open-ended universe
of information that parties may seek to present on appeal. The
same principle applies to the work of a trial judge. That is, trial
judges should base their decisions on evidence adduced by the
parties, as opposed to formulating a decision based, in whole or
in part, on information that they obtain independently. As noted
by one court,

Moreover, aside from practical problems associated with
appellate review, trial judges unnecessarily create problems for
the parties when they consider extrajudicial observations or the
perspectives of outside individuals. For example, by observing a
party outside of the proceeding and then considering those
observations in the decisionmaking process, the judge
essentially becomes a source of evidence. Although judges can

05/10/2017 10:58:23

10. In re Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (citation omitted).
11. Vaughn v. Shelby Williams of Tenn., Inc., 813 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tenn. 1991).
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appellate courts are put in an awkward position . . . [when]
evidence obtained through private inquiry or observation,
as well as its probative value, is not shown in the record,
making an evaluation of the information on appeal difficult,
if not impossible. 11
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generally take judicial notice of the law and certain types of
facts, a judge presiding over a trial cannot serve as a witness—
and for good reason. The most “obvious one is that the system
of justice does not appear to be impartial if the judge charged
with the duty of adjudicating the litigation also acts as a source
of evidence.” 12
To be sure, straying beyond the record will attract attention
on appeal.
E. USING TONE IMPROPERLY

judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical
or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties,
or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality
challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that

05/10/2017 10:58:23

12. Id.
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Just as the tone of the judge’s voice creates an impression
with the listener, so the tone of the judge’s writing creates an
impression with the reader. Tone is an important element of
judicial writing, and a variety of tones are possible in a written
decision, such as casual, matter-of-fact, angry, annoyed,
authoritative, impersonal, argumentative, and lecturing. Judicial
writing is, of course, formal writing, and the tone of the decision
should reflect the serious responsibility the judge has assumed
as the adjudicator. Generally, the shorter the sentence the more
formal the tone, as shorter sentences have a more blunt,
business-like effect. Longer sentences tend to convey a less
formal tone.
Along these same lines, condescending, sarcastic, insulting,
or angry words should be avoided in orders and opinions.
Temper tantrums on paper come across as unprofessional and
petty. It is one thing to reject a party’s argument as
“unpersuasive” or “lacking merit,” but another to characterize a
party’s position as “utterly unconvincing, if not absurd.” Words
can and do sting. And if they are written words, they can endure
for the ages and be seen by untold numbers of people, without
regard to jurisdiction or geography.
The same cautionary note applies to a judge’s oral
comments. The United States Supreme Court has observed that
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derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if
they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism
as to make fair judgment impossible. 13

Generally, a measured tone is easier to achieve, both orally and
in writing, when the judge remains focused on the facts and the
law rather than the judge’s feelings about the parties or their
conduct, a task sometimes made difficult by the egregious nature
of certain types of conduct.
Similarly, nothing good comes from taking cheap shots at
the parties or their lawyers, as these reflect poorly on the writer
and demean the courts. For example, a federal district court
judge wrote about
two extremely likable lawyers, who have together delivered
some of the most amateurish pleadings ever . . . , an effort
which leads the Court to surmise but one plausible
explanation. Both attorneys have obviously entered into a
secret pact—complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic
words—to draft their pleadings entirely in crayon on the
back sides of gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope
that the Court would be so charmed by their child-like
efforts that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their
briefing would go unnoticed. 14

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (emphasis in original).
Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 668, 670 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
Id. at 672.
Id. at 672 n.4.
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13.
14.
15.
16.
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The judge further observed that one of the lawyers “has been
writing crisply in ink since the second grade,” and suggested
that the “lovable” attorney on the other side “upgrade to a nice
shiny No. 2 pencil or at least sharpen what’s left of the stubs of
his crayons for what remains of this heart-stopping, spinetingling action.” 15 However, the latter attorney was cautioned by
the judge “not to run with a sharpened writing utensil in hand.”16
While the judge in this case may have had ample reason to be
unimpressed with counsels’ efforts, an alternative approach to
the problem would, I believe, have reflected more favorably on
the individual judge and the judicial system as a whole.
A simple way of avoiding the perception of bias or
disparagement is to use objective language whenever possible.
For example, do not write “Mr. Smith is a deadbeat dad because

39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 8 Side A

05/10/2017 10:58:23

DAVIDSONEXECEDIT (DO NOT DELETE)

4/24/2017 6:12 PM

ATTRACTING UNDUE SCRUTINY ON APPEAL

185

he has not paid child support in five years.” Instead, write “Mr.
Smith has not paid child support in five years.” Do not write
“Ms. Jones is a terrible driver because she has had three
accidents in three years.” Instead, write “Ms. Jones has been in
three accidents in the past three years.” If the objective
statement is true, the same message will be conveyed without
resorting to what might be viewed as inflammatory language.
Admittedly, this type of restraint is not always easy to muster,
but judges are expected to act with restraint nonetheless.
F. LOSING JUDICIAL BEARING OR DEMEANOR
Judges are human and, like anyone else, can be prone to
impatience, annoyance, dissatisfaction, and anger. But unlike
other people, judges are legally and ethically required to “act at
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” 17 As stated by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court,
[i]nevitably, members of the public will, from time to time,
disagree with decisions of our courts, but that disagreement
should never rest upon lack of confidence in the court’s
integrity. Public confidence in the integrity of the judicial
system is essential. It is our responsibility, and the
responsibility of every judge, to merit and maintain that
confidence. 18

05/10/2017 10:58:23

17. In re Bell, 344 S.W.3d 304, 319 (Tenn. 2011) (citation omitted).
18. In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings against Aulik, 429 N.W.2d 759, 768 (Wis.
1988).
19. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 550–51.
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This too is often easier said than done.
Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
some litigants are “thoroughly reprehensible” individuals toward
whom the trial judge might understandably “be exceedingly ill
disposed.” 19 And, although the overwhelming majority of
attorneys conduct themselves with civility and strive to adhere
to the highest of ethical standards, some have difficulty
maintaining the appropriate decorum, making it harder for the
judge to remain dispassionate. One lawyer, for example, refused
to stop talking after being warned by the judge that he would be
jailed if he continued to speak. He refused to be silent, went to
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jail, and saw his law license suspended. 20 Another lawyer sent
an email to a judge telling the judge to “get down off your high
horse and act like a man instead of a bully and clown.” 21 Such
behavior can try the patience of the most temperate of judges.
Judges do not expect to be treated like royalty, nor should
they. However, they do expect to be treated with respect, and
rightly so. But the reverse is true as well. When judges, either
trial or appellate, treat parties or their lawyers with anything less
than respect, it reflects poorly on both the individual judge and
the judicial system as a whole.
G. USING EXTREME LANGUAGE

05/10/2017 10:58:23

20. See Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 812–13 (suspending license); U.S. v. Moncier, 571
F.3d 593, 598 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The Court: ‘Mr. Moncier, one more word and you’re
going to jail.’ Moncier: ‘May I speak to my—’ The Court: ‘Officers, take him into custody.
We’ll be in recess.’”); see also Moncier v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 406 S.W.3d 139
(Tenn. 2013) (denying petition for relief from payment of costs imposed by disciplinary
order).
21. Hancock v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 447 S.W.3d 844, 848,
858 (Tenn. 2014) (reprinting screen shot of email message from lawyer to judge and
affirming thirty-day suspension from practice).
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A less conspicuous way trial judges may draw attention on
appeal is by frequently using extreme or exaggerated words,
such as “obviously,” “clearly,” “always,” or “never.” I once
reviewed a trial judge’s decision containing a lengthy
description of the facts and, at the end of that discussion, the
judge concluded that those facts “clearly and unmistakably” led
to a particular result. The result, however, was anything but
clear and unmistakable to me.
Perhaps there is a streak of contrariness in human nature
that urges us to reject absolute assertions. Whether or not that is
so, I have found that when a party or a judge writes that
something is obvious or clear, the point is sometimes anything
but obvious or clear. Indeed, such words often go hand in hand
with weak or unreasonable arguments. While I am not
suggesting that absolute language has no place in drafting a
decision, I am suggesting that such words be used with care.
Absolute language naturally draws the reader’s attention,
some of whom may be quick to question the accuracy of the
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assertion. How often can it realistically be said that something is
always true or never the case?
H. LETTING DOWN YOUR GUARD WHILE ON THE RECORD
For most trial judges, being recorded either by a court
reporter or by some other means is a routine matter. And therein
lies the problem—forgetting there is a recorder, whether human
or electronic, in the room.
While working as a staff attorney for the Tennessee
Supreme Court, I once reviewed a trial transcript in a hotly
contested appeal. Although subtleties like tone and mood can be
difficult to gauge from a cold record, it was apparent in this
instance that the trial judge was losing patience with an
aggressive lawyer and vice versa. At one point, after the lawyer
made an impertinent comment following the judge’s overruling
one of his many objections, the exasperated trial judge said,
“I’ve ruled on your objection and, if you think I’m wrong,
appeal to the Supreme Court and let those sons-of-b****** in
Nashville tell me I’m wrong.” 22 The lawyer happily obliged.
Failing to exercise appropriate discretion while on the
record will not go unnoticed on appeal, even if the appellate
court does not mention the lapse in its opinion.
I. FAILING TO DECIDE A POTENTIALLY DISPOSITIVE ISSUE

05/10/2017 10:58:23

22. Because I no longer have ready access to the transcript, I am relying on my
memory of the exchange. This may not be an exact rendering of the judge’s statement, but
it is close and conveys essentially what was in the transcript.
23. See, e.g., Henley v. Cobb, 916 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Tenn.1996) (noting that “[i]t is
well settled that Tennessee law strongly favors the resolution of all disputes on their
merits” (citations omitted)).
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Most judges prefer reaching the merits of a case to
disposing of the dispute on a technicality or procedural point.
The parties have, after all, turned to the legal system for help in
resolving a problem that they cannot resolve themselves, and a
decision short of the merits frustrates those expectations. Thus,
so-called threshold issues may be viewed by some as obstacles
to avoid. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, the law itself stresses the
resolution of cases on the merits. 23
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However, many threshold issues, such as personal
jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, notice, or the timeliness
of a claim or defense, can be dispositive of the case. Thus, as
well-intentioned as the trial judge may be in reaching the merits,
the failure to address such threshold issues can make quick work
of the matter on appeal. Indeed, appeals of this type can all but
invite a remand.
J. MAKING THE SIMPLE DIFFICULT
Making the simple difficult is poor judging. The parties are
already in a quandary regarding their dispute, and having the
courts unnecessarily add another layer of difficulty serves to
further frustrate and confuse matters.
Conversely, making the difficult simple is excellent
judging. This can be no small task given the complexity of some
areas of the law. The principles discussed above, such as
avoiding flippancy or exaggerations and placing a premium on
precision, brevity, and clarity, can help. So can maintaining a
demeanor commensurate with the gravity of the proceeding and
never losing one’s temper. Here are some additional guidelines
to consider:
Dispatch weak or unreasonable arguments quickly
and definitively. As one court has observed, “[i]t is
not the role of the courts . . . to construct a litigant’s
case.” 24 If a party’s evidence is—or arguments
are—too weak to carry the day, unambiguously
make that point.

x

If the parties have filed a statement of the evidence
in lieu of a transcript, make certain that it is both
accurate and complete because the appellate judges
will use it as the factual lens through which the
decision below is evaluated.

05/10/2017 10:58:23

24. Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615
(Tenn. 2010).
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x

There are two ways lawyers destroy their credibility
in their briefs. The first is to cite a case for a
proposition of law for which it does not stand. The
second is to make a factual assertion unsupported
by the record. The same goes for judges in their
decisions.

x

Fully develop the basis for the decision, leaving no
gaps in the analysis for the appellate judges to fall
through. Just as lawyers are expected to blend the
law with the facts in their briefs, judges should do
the same in their decisions. Being too conclusory is
a common problem, placing the appellate judges in
the difficult position of having to infer the rationale
for the decision.

x

Unlike oral arguments that can jump around from
topic to topic in disjointed fashion, the trial court’s
written decision should lay out a comprehensive
analysis of the issues so that the appellate judges
can follow your thinking, especially in factually or
legally complex or novel cases.

x

Be sure the decision is anchored in the law or the
appellate judges may send it back to you. Ask
yourself whether your decision leaves any issues
unresolved and explain why if so. Otherwise, the
appellate judges may think you overlooked them
and remand the case.

x

Do not ignore adverse authority. Confront it. If the
authority is not distinguishable and is otherwise
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Although of course it is not a brief, a trial court’s
written decision is meant to be persuasive, and the
art of persuasion favors quality, not quantity. The
longer the decision, the more unfocused and diluted
it may become, and the less certain the case may
seem to the appellate judges.
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binding, follow it. If you don’t, the case may come
back to you.
Be cautious when copying and pasting from prior
decisions, making sure to update the research to
reflect any new developments. Imagine learning
from a higher court that a key case you relied upon
was overruled before your decision was released.

x

Make sure that your decision has a logical flow. If
sentences and paragraphs are inserted where they
interrupt a line of thought, or where they have no
connection to what precedes or follows, coherence
is lost. When this happens, the appellate judges may
have trouble following your analysis. Transitional
words at the beginnings of paragraphs help
appellate judges string your thoughts together and
frame their own analysis of the case.

x

Use headings and subheadings to identify where
treatment of one subject ends and another begins.
Use long sentences and long paragraphs sparingly,
as too much information may bog readers down and
make it harder for them to follow your analysis.

x

Edit carefully. Proofread, revise, and use great care
in editing, checking citations, verifying quotations,
and polishing your wording for maximum
effectiveness. Readers may equate sloppy editing
with sloppy research and analysis.

K. OVERREACTING TO REVERSALS, MODIFICATIONS,
OR REMANDS
Do not take a reversal, a modification, or a remand
personally. I have never met a judge or justice who served on
the bench for any appreciable length of time who had never been
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reversed. 25 Nearly every judge has a higher court looking over
his or her shoulder, so a reversal should be expected from time
to time. 26 Occasional disagreement is simply the nature of a
tiered system of legal decisionmaking. Indeed, if appellate
courts never reversed lower courts, something would be amiss.
Thick judicial skin comes with time on the bench. But new
to the bench or not, trial judges would be well-advised to take
the information before them, make the best decision possible,
and then forget about it. If an appeal follows and the appellate
court reverses or modifies the decision, taking it personally can
become an unnecessary source of frustration and secondguessing. Be careful not to repeat the same mistake, but move
on. A pattern of reversals is, of course, a different matter
altogether—one beyond the scope of this essay.
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25. The Fourth Circuit even reversed the decision in a case in which then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist sat as the trial judge. Heislup v. Town of Colonial Beach, 813 F.2d 401
(4th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (tbl.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987). Readers interested in
learning a little more about Justice Rehnquist’s appearance on the federal trial bench can
consult David G. Leitch, An Unwavering Man and Judge, 10 TEX. J. L. & POLITICS 293,
293–94 (2005).
26. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[R]eversal
by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. . . . We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).

